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Rethinking Clientelism: 




It has now been more than a decade since the Brazilian military relinquished its 
hold on the electoral process. Effective democratic governance has yet to be 
established, however. Traditional elites still dominate the scene, political par 
ties remain weak, fragmented and unstable, and public administrations contin 
ue to pay lip-service to demands for citizens' rights. The source of these various 
problems of democratic governance is, by all accounts, the widespread practice 
of exchanging votes for favors, otherwise known as clientelism. It is clientelism 
that forges relations of dependency between masses and elites. It is clientelism 
that stifles popular organization and protest. And, it is clientelism that reduces 
elections to localized disputes over the distribution of spoils.1 
In this essay, I will argue that clientelism is indeed an essential and enduring 
feature of the Brazilian political landscape. I will also argue, however, that both 
the form and the function of contemporary clientelism remain unexamined 
and that, as a consequence, its role in the political process has been misunder 
stood or, worse still, ignored. With few exceptions, clientelism is condemned as 
an instrument of elite control and called upon to explain all that is wrong with 
Brazilian democracy. I will argue that clientelism should not be seen as some 
immutable force or fixed thing, but as a relationship that is subject to constant 
challenge, renegotiation and change. I will also argue that, under certain cir 
cumstances, clientelism plays a positive and largely unheralded role in the 
process of democratic consolidation. 
My comments in the first part of this essay shall be confined, for the most 
part, to the literature on democratization in Brazil. Towards the end, however, 
I will be drawing on recent research on clientelism from other contexts in Latin 
America. There are two reasons for this. First, there is precious little research 
on the way that clientelism works in Brazil. And, second, it has become accept 
ed practice to blame clientelism for the slow and halting pace of democratic 
consolidation not only in Brazil, but in almost every other country in the re 
gion.2 
* The author would like to thank Renato Boschi, Brian Wampler and two anonymous readers for 
comments on earlier drafts of this essay. 
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Clientelism is Dead... 
Between 1964 and 1985, dates that roughly correspond to the most recent peri 
od of authoritarian rule, Brazil underwent a dramatic transformation from an 
agrarian, primary product producer to one of the world's largest industrial 
economies. Industrialization was accompanied by the proletarianization of 
much of the labor force, the emergence of a complex social class structure and 
rapid rates of urbanization that were fueled, in part, by a massive population 
shift from the now peripheral Northeast to the dynamic and overburdened 
cities of the South. 
Observers of Brazilian politics predicted that, together, these processes of 
'massification' would weaken the power of traditional landed elites and liber 
ate an increasingly mobile population from the tyranny of small town and rural 
life. Others pointed to the expansion, throughout the authoritarian era, of an 
increasingly powerful and interventionist state. According to Paul Cammack, 
this state was created, in part, to introduce rational policy making and planning 
procedures to an administration that, to this point, had been dominated by 
corrupt, so-called traditional politicians who distributed public goods and ser 
vices as patronage. This state also provided a significant source of new employ 
ment opportunities that were allocated according to merit and promoted at 
least the idea that government intervention was based not on the principle of 
political favoritism but of social need.3 
More recently, scholars of Brazilian politics have maintained that the elim 
ination of clientelism has also been facilitated by the rapid development of 
print and, more significantly, television media as the principal means of mass 
communication and political socialization. According to Venicio de Lima, 
mass media, as opposed to local party structures, has been the deciding factor 
in a number of what, in recent years, can be characterized as regularly held and 
relatively free elections.4 Regularly held and relatively free elections, in turn, 
have meant increased competition among elites and an electorate that is both 
more familiar and comfortable with its recently acquired democratic respon 
sibilities.5 
Finally, many scholars attribute the transformation of Brazilian politics in 
recent years to the emergence, in the late 1970s and early 1980s, of so-called 
new social movements. Inspired by what was often described as the resurrec 
tion of civil society, early observers of the new social movement phenomenon 
predicted that the popular sector would wage a 'war of position' that would 
destroy the legitimacy of the authoritarian state, undermine support for clien 
telist political parties, and sweep the radical, democratic Left to power.6 Sub 
sequent disappointments, the near election of Partido dos Trabalhadores' (PT) 
Luis Ignacio da Silva notwithstanding, have given rise to more cautious per 
spectives on the impact of social movements on post authoritarian politics. 
Instead of predicting the strategic gains to be made by popular-based formal 
organizations and political parties, scholars now focus their attention on the 
democratization of political culture and social relations as a whole.7 What this 
means is that while few would claim that new social movements have revolu 
tionized Brazilian politics, there is a consensus that they have articulated new 
demands, established alternative discursive arenas, challenged dominant prac 
tices and achieved, at the very least, a measure of symbolic power.8 
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More specifically, there are those who argue that the emergence of an auton 
omous and vital popular sector has meant that political actors are forced to 
work much harder as they are confronted by an ever increasing number of 
popular organizations, NGOs and representative bodies.9 They also argue that 
politicians, political parties and public administrations can no longer rely on 
the distribution of patronage, in the form of public works and political appoint 
ments, as a means to generate or secure votes.10 In other words, the foundations 
of clientelism are gradually being undermined. 
Sonia Alvarez and Evelina Dagnino, for example, claim that what they refer 
to as social movement webs have 're wo ven or reconfigured.. .the fabric of col 
lective action in Brazil'.11 They also maintain that social movement webs have 
fashioned new constituencies based on 'communities of equals' that are con 
frontational, oftentimes disloyal, and committed to the ideal of rights. These 
new popular movements, argue Alvarez and Dagnino, are to be distinguished 
from those that endured traditional clientelist ties with the 'populist-corpora 
tist and authoritarian political establishments' of the recent and not so recent 
past.12 
Long Live Clientelism... 
The claim that clientelism is of declining significance in Brazil has not gone 
unchallenged. Many scholars dispute the widely-held assumption that clien 
telism is the inevitable victim of modernization and point out that, while per 
sonalism and dependency have characterized elite-mass relations since the 
time of the conquest, the exchange of votes for favors is, in fact, a relatively 
recent phenomenon.13 It was only in the post World War II era that the more 
traditional elements of the landed elite confronted the fact that they needed 
new, more sophisticated strategies to protect their interests in the face of the 
rapid expansion of the state. It was also in the post World War II era that Brazil 
entered the age of mass politics, meaning that, for the first time since the end of 
the nineteenth century, a significant element of the population was granted the 
right to vote.14 
Others argue that the process of bureaucratization, far from eliminating cli 
entelism, has, in fact, greatly increased the opportunities that exist for buying 
votes. Maria Castro and Vilmar Faria insist that government emergency and 
assistance programs continue to be made available on a selective and piece 
meal basis and that administrative posts, while short-term and inherently un 
stable, provide access to considerable public resources.15 Barry Ames has also 
argued that despite recent attempts to 'modernize' the civil service, it is still the 
case that the fate of perhaps the majority of public sector employees, and a 
significant proportion of the population as a whole, depends on the presence 
and goodwill of a patron, or what is popularly referred to as a quern indica or 
pistoldo.16 
There are also those who claim that too much has been made of the impact of 
mass media and that the outcome of both local and national elections is still 
largely determined by carefully constructed political networks and the rela 
tionships that are brokered between them.17 Many scholars argue that 'mod 
ern' political parties developed exceptionally late in Brazil and that the mil 
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itary inherited a clientelist system that it maintained through restricted, but 
nonetheless continuous, electoral competition, low levels of repression, and 
substantial government spending. As a consequence, the transition to democ 
racy, when it came, was dominated by so-called traditional political actors 
whose power was based on archaic patterns of mobilization and who subse 
quently engaged in a spree of 'wild clientelism' in the late 1980s and early 
1990s.18 
Frances Hagopian argues that the spending spree of the immediate post 
authoritarian era was made possible by an increase in government payroll 
spending, the decentralization of power to state and municipal governments 
and massive local government borrowing from state controlled banks.19 Others 
maintain that the post authoritarian spending spree was a product of the in 
stitutional context within which elections were now held. The combination, 
peculiar to only a few countries, of proportional representation, open party 
lists and large multimember districts resulted in extreme party instability and 
considerable inter and intra-party competition.20 Furthermore, according to 
Scott Mainwaring, the Brazilian military had, by then, stripped Congress of any 
real legislative function. This meant, in effect, that politicians had little alterna 
tive but to rely on the distribution of patronage as a means to secure election or 
reelection. Thus, for many, democratization resulted not in the elimination of 
clientelism but in the proliferation of clientelist-based 'deals'.21 
Scholars have also disputed the assumption that so-called new social move 
ments have transformed authoritarian structures and democratized political 
and social relations. They have argued that popular organizations tend to be 
extremely unstable and short-lived and that they bring together an insignif 
icant element of the population.22 They have also argued that the vast majority 
of popular sector demands are for limited, primarily economic resources that 
are easily absorbed or diverted by the state.23 Finally, scholars have also argued 
that the obsession with radical, if somewhat marginal aspects of Brazilian cul 
ture has led social scientists to underestimate support for the military and to 
ignore the fact that many organizations serve traditional functions and repro 
duce relations of hierarchy upon which clientelism ultimately depends.24 
Perhaps the most common explanation for the persistence of clientelism, 
however, is widespread poverty and increasingly savage inequality. Literally 
millions have failed to benefit or have benefitted only marginally from the 
fruits of capitalist development in Brazil.25 Indeed, widespread poverty and 
inequality have led many scholars to suggest that it is difficult, if not impossible, 
for Brazil's poor to participate effectively in the political process and that they 
have become, to quote Marx, the 'bribed tool of reactionary intrigue'.26 
The assumption that the least privileged elements of Brazilian society are 
unable to participate effectively in the political process needs to be examined 
extremely carefully, however. I say this because it informs not only the largely 
academic debate about democratization, but also attempts at institutional re 
form such as the elimination of the compulsory vote.27 The problem with this 
assumption is that it is based on extremely thin evidence and that it misrepre 
sents what is, arguably, the vast majority of the Brazilian population's most 
effective political weapon. 
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Clientelism as Tradition 
Scholarly images of clientelism, from both Brazil and elsewhere in Latin 
America, are overwhelmingly negative. As a system of what is often consid 
ered pre-modern politics it is blamed for everything from cycles of ruinous 
inflation to the breakdown of democratic regimes. More importantly, at least 
for the purposes of this essay, clientelism is also blamed for the disorganization 
and marginalization of Brazil's poor. Most scholars agree that the extreme 
vulnerability of perhaps the majority of the Brazilian population compels it to 
literally 'sell' its votes to candidates for public office in exchange for the deliv 
ery or simply the promise of patronage. The consequences of this exchange are 
thought to be as follows. 
First of all, most scholars argue that clientelism is responsible for the estab 
lishment and consolidation of networks of solidarity, trust and, more signif 
icantly, subordination between political elites and masses that interfere with, if 
not preclude, the collective organization of the popular sector on the basis of 
social class.28 Collective organization is inhibited because political returns are 
offered along vertical lines and because of what are perceived as asymmetrical, 
patron-client relations between leaders and followers of client organizations 
themselves. Indeed, Guillermo O'Donnell insists that clientelism is not only 
responsible for the fragmentation of the poor, but that it generates 'fierce re 
sistance on behalf of subalterns to organize as collective subjects and to be 
represented as such'.29 
Second, there are many who believe that clientelism discourages what is 
alternatively referred to as 'real' or 'meaningful' political participation and 
that the relationship between politician and voter is so unequal that the ex 
change of votes for favors is almost wholly dependent on the goodwill and 
generosity of those in positions of power. Indeed, Fabio Wanderly Reis argues 
that the uncertainty and asymmetry of this relationship encourages would-be 
clients to become passive, uninformed and essentially disinterested participa 
nts in the political process and to shy away from alternative, more confronta 
tional means of interest representation.30 
Third, most scholars claim that the rewards that are sometimes obtained 
through clientelism are inconsequential and unworthy of the vote and that the 
role played by patronage in elections is evidence of the backwardness, defi 
ciency and low level of sophistication of the average Brazilian voter. One of the 
problems associated with clientelist exchange, therefore, is that it focuses the 
popular sector's attention on the immediate acquisition of localized and small 
scale goods and services as opposed to a series of more significant, generalized 
and long term demands. Thus, for many, clientelism makes it extremely diffi 
cult for voters to organize their thoughts in terms of a left-right or any other 
continuum and places tremendous strain on what is often referred to as ide 
ological or programmatic politics.31 
Finally, most scholars agree that clientelism, when looked at from a systemic 
level, constrains universalism, devitalizes civil society and prevents the popular 
sector from mounting sustained pressure on the state.32 Clientelism also, by 
implication, allows politicians to ignore what are perceived to be weak and 
disorganized actors and to by-pass and, as a consequence, undermine so-called 
normal democratic procedures by essentially buying votes.33 
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My objective in this essay is not to deny that any, or even all, of these obser 
vations about the relationship between Brazilian elites and masses are true. 
Rather, the point is to suggest the possibility that clientelism performs other 
functions and to caution against its use as a largely unexamined and residual 
category that accounts for all that is wrong with contemporary Brazilian de 
mocracy. Unfortunately, as Jose Murilo de Carvalho observed almost three 
decades ago, 'the relationship between leaders and followers is not clarified. 
This relationship is often characterized as 'paternalistic' or 'clientelistic' but 
these terms are not clearly defined and no systematic procedure is adopted to 
clarify how this relationship works'.34 
The most recent and, in many ways, most systematic research on clientelism 
has been conducted by Frances Hagopian. Hagopian claims that the Brazilian 
military was ultimately compelled to enlist the support of so-called traditional 
political elites who controlled 'the underside' of the state, which conducts 'low 
politics' and organizes consent'.35 These political elites, argues Hagopian, sub 
sequently used their access to the spoils of state-led capitalist development to 
lock up an expanding and increasingly urban electorate that had, nonetheless, 
been 'conditioned by years of patronage-based appeals'.36 
Contemporary clientelism, according to Hagopian, can best be described as 
a distinctive and resilient system of top-down mobilization that is based not so 
much on coercion or traditional forms of authority, but on the selective and 
highly personalized exchange of goods, services and employment opportuni 
ties for the vote. This system, she argues, discourages political participation 
beyond the ballot box, is nonideological in character, and interferes with, if not 
precludes, the extension of democracy.37 
Hagopian's work is interesting in that she recognizes that certain aspects of 
the clientelist relationship have changed. Unfortunately, her research focuses 
almost exclusively on institutional representations of the clientelist system in 
terms of the career trajectories of so-called traditional political elites, with 
particular emphasis on the state of Minas Gerais. Hagopian is left no choice, 
therefore, but to assume that the persistence of traditional elites can be ex 
plained by the persistence of traditional, by which she means clientelist, poli 
tics. Hagopian pays little or no attention, however, to the meaning or form of 
clientelism at the popular level or, in her words, the specific ways in which the 
state and the popular sectors in contemporary Brazil are 'attached'.38 
Similar conclusions as to the significance of clientelism in Brazil were reac 
hed by Eli Diniz in her classic study of the Movimento Democratico Brasileiro 
(MDB) in Rio de Janeiro.39 Diniz claimed that the image of the MDB in Rio 
was very much at odds with that of the national party in that the electoral 
prowess of its dominant faction, otherwise known as Chaguistas, depended 
almost exclusively on the selective exchange of votes for favors. 
Diniz argued that the city of Rio de Janeiro in the early 1980s could be 
divided up into distinct, mutually exclusive zones that were dominated by indi 
vidual Chaguista politicians. These politicians disposed of a certain number of 
low level government jobs, facilitated access to state and municipal adminis 
trations, and controlled both the activities and outlook of local popular sector 
organizations. This was particularly true, according to Diniz, of the relation 
ship between traditional elements within the MDB and favela neighborhood 
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associations that adopted passive, nonconfrontational strategies for the pursuit 
of a series of local, relatively inconsequential demands.40 
The Chaguistas' stranglehold on the local population was only challenged in 
the late 1970s and early 1980s when elements of the fa vela movement pushed 
for the organization of more autonomous, combative and ideologically-ori 
ented neighborhood associations. This led, according to Diniz, to the emer 
gence of competing federations of favelas in Rio which represented, what were 
fast becoming, distinct and diametrically opposed bases of popular political 
support. 
Diniz's study is interesting in that it represents at least an attempt to come to 
grips with the phenomenon of clientelism at the local as opposed to regional or 
national level of politics. Like Hagopian, however, Diniz relies too heavily on 
aggregate-level election data and largely untested assumptions about the polit 
ical behavior upon which such data are based; save for a small selection of 
interviews with politicians and leaders of favela neighborhood associations. 
Furthermore, Diniz is guilty of insisting on a stark and extremely rigid dis 
tinction between traditional, or clientelist, politics and modern, or radical, poli 
tics at both the legislative and popular levels.41 
The notion that clientelism and radicalism represent different styles and 
patterns of collective action, or inaction, has been developed most fully by 
Susan Stokes in her study of a low-income neighborhood in Lima, Peru.42 
Stokes argues that for much of this century the urban poor existed as the pas 
sive, fatalistic, loyal and, most significantly, misinformed clients of an oligarchic 
state. Then, in the late 1960s, the Velasco military regime unleashed hitherto 
dormant counterhegemonic forces that it was subsequently unable to control. 
This led, according to Stokes, to the emergence of a bifurcated popular politi 
cal culture that expressed the very different world views of what she character 
izes as hierarchical clientelists and class-solidary radicals who 'promulgated an 
ethic of rights, protest, participation, and egalitarianism'.43 
Stokes' work is interesting in that it is based on extensive field research 
among the urban poor. Unlike others, therefore, she gives us a sense of the 
ways in which the various relationships between elites and masses are both 
perceived and played out. Her research is problematic, however, in that in her 
haste to convince us of the rising tide of popular radicalism and protest, she 
reduces clientelism to a timeless and unchanging mode of participation, or 
non-participation, that is the product, not even of strategic or symbolic resist 
ance, but of 'false consciousness'. In other words, Stokes wishes us to believe 
that the subordination of the least privileged elements of Peruvian society has 
been so successful and complete that is has been unaffected by massive social 
change, labor union organization, land invasion, peasant-led rebellion and the 
dissemination of radical or even liberal democratic discourse.44 
Clientelism as (Post) Modernity 
In his study of union politics in the industrial suburbs of Sao Paulo, John 
French argues that it has become accepted dogma that, until fairly recently, 
Brazilian labor unions have been subordinated to the state. This dogma, he 
suggests, is based not on careful empirical investigation but on theoretically 
This content downloaded  on Mon, 11 Mar 2013 12:08:18 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
14 | Robert Gay 
charged speculation. More to the point, French suggests that this has enabled 
scholars of 'new' unionism, particularly in Sao Paulo, to make largely unsub 
stantiated claims about the greater class-consciousness of contemporary Brazi 
lian workers.45 
Much the same could be said about recent research on popular political 
participation outside of the context of organized labor. Scholars of contempo 
rary Brazilian politics have argued that new social movements in the post au 
thoritarian era have been organized on the basis of new ideas about collective 
identity and citizens' rights that distinguish them from the fragmented and 
hierarchical 'action sets' that tied the popular sector to elites in the past.46 This 
comparison, I would argue, is no longer valid, if indeed it ever was, in that 
changes in the relationship between elites and masses in Brazil have had an 
impact on all political relationships, including those based on clientelism. 
There is considerable evidence to suggest that clientelism, both in Brazil and 
elsewhere in Latin America, is increasingly a means to pursue the delivery of 
collective as opposed to individual goods.47 This means that political clienteles 
are less likely to assume the form of loose clusters of independently negotiated 
dyads than organizations, communities or even whole regions that fashion re 
lationships or reach understandings with politicians, public officials and admin 
istrations. In other words, contemporary clientelism exhibits both hierarchical 
and relational elements and elements of collective organization and identity.48 
There is also evidence that clientelism is an increasingly voluntary, trans 
actional and, as a result, unstable relationship between both political elites and 
masses and the representatives and rank-and-file members of clientelist-based 
organizations themselves. Clientelist politicians and community leaders who 
fail to deliver on a consistent basis soon lose support and are replaced by oth 
ers. Indeed, there are those who argue that the relationship between clientelist 
politician and voter is more sporadic, instrumental and diffuse in nature than 
the dense, stable and all-embracing networks of informal reciprocity and mu 
tual solidarity that characterize the relationships between and among elites 
and the middle class.49 
Finally, it is also important to note that the relationship between clientelist 
politician and voter in Brazil is by no means as unequal as it once was. The 
recent transition to democracy has witnessed a dramatic increase in the level of 
both inter and intra-party competition for votes.50 Furthermore, changes in 
election procedure, such as the introduction of official ballots and, more re 
cently, automated voting machines, have significantly reduced both the oppor 
tunities that are available for fraud and the degree of control that politicians 
enjoy over the vote. It is not uncommon, for example, for voters to demand 
compensation prior to an election and to throw their support behind someone 
else. The consequences of such a deception are, arguably, much greater for a 
candidate for public office than for those who chose to dishonor such an 'agree 
ment'.51 
This is not to say that patronage is no longer rewarded at the ballot box. On 
the contrary, this is still the essence of clientelism. The problem is that we have 
become so accustomed to thinking of clientelism as a mechanism of institution 
al control - often referred to as corporatism 
- or the product of 'false con 
sciousness' - often referred to as populism 
- that we have failed to consider the 
possibility that clientelism might be embraced as a popular political strategy.52 
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Even Jonathan Fox, in his brilliant and ground-breaking essay on elite-mass 
relations in Mexico, claims that the distinction between what he refers to as 
'semiclientelism' and pluralism is the ability of the popular sector 
- in the latter 
case - to gain access to material resources without giving up its right to express 
its interests autonomously.53 Fox also argues that 'if the state's mechanisms for 
enforcing voter compliance continue to weaken, then more and more citizens 
may well accept pork-barrel funding but also still vote their conscience, as civic 
activism broadens and deepens'.54 
What I am suggesting is that there is no necessary contradiction between 
rewarding patronage at the ballot box and 'voting one's conscience'. I am also 
suggesting that rewarding patronage at the ballot box is increasingly a means 
by which a seasoned and increasingly disillusioned electorate expresses its col 
lective approval, or disapproval, of a candidate for public office or adminis 
tration's performance.55 And, finally, I am also suggesting that, under such cir 
cumstances, clientelism has less to do with the exchange of votes for favors, 
than with the exchange of votes for what political actors would like to present 
as favors but the least privileged elements of the population demand or claim 
as rights. In other words, not only is it becoming increasingly difficult for politi 
cal actors to create a sense of loyalty or obligation on the part of the electorate, 
it is also becoming increasingly necessary for politicians, public officials and 
administrations to disguise the fact that they are, ultimately, in the business of 
buying votes.56 
Of course, as I have already mentioned, there are those who would insist that 
rights have little to do with the selective and occasional distribution of milk 
tokens, the paving of roads, the building of schools or the installation of neigh 
borhood sewage systems. And, furthermore, that clientelism, as a strategy that 
is based on the delivery of such goods and services, undermines any attempt to 
propagate coherent ideologies or establish programs based on principles of 
universalism and entitlement. This perspective, I believe, is both simplistic and, 
more to the point, elitist.57 
First of all, it is a mistake to assume that the exchange of votes for goods and 
services is necessarily devoid of ideological content. Since the early 1980s ev 
eryone, including the Right, has been talking about popular participation in 
government. Popular participation, in and of itself, is no guarantee, however, 
that issues of popular concern will be resolved. Indeed, there are those who 
claim that popular participation in government is a cheap and effective way of 
demobilizing and exhausting the opposition.58 In this context, it is important to 
appreciate that the role played by patronage in elections is evidence, in many 
instances, of the emergence of a new breed of voter who demands respect, 
efficiency and, most important of all, accountability from public officials and 
administrations of all political persuasions. All too often, the 'politically in 
correct' electoral choices of the popular sector are dismissed, out of hand, 
without considering the possibility that they are based on criteria that cut 
across traditional political boundaries.59 
Second, the assumption that the popular sector is somehow the captive do 
main of clientelist-oriented politicians is clearly unfounded. Many scholars 
have found evidence to suggest that different elections mean different things 
and are approached as such. In other words, while individuals, or groups of 
individuals, may vote on the basis of the promise or delivery of fairly specific 
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and localized goods at one level, they are just as likely to 'vote their conscience' 
at other levels.60 This appreciation of the different functions of various levels of 
municipal, state and federal government suggests that clientelism is not an 
all-embracing, imposed-from-above world view but a strategy that is both se 
lectively employed and the product of a sophisticated and reasoned grasp of 
the political process as a whole.61 
Finally, it should also be kept in mind that while universalism and citizenship 
are attractive concepts in the abstract, they take on very different meanings in 
the course of everyday life. A decade or so of regularly held and relatively free 
elections has done nothing to convince people that politicians are any less 
corrupt or insincere and has left more people without access to decent paying 
jobs, education, health care and housing than ever before. It should come as no 
surprise, therefore, that the least privileged elements of Brazilian society 
should be suspicious of what are essentially foreign ideologies, distrust formal 
institutions, and embrace clientelism as a hedge against what is often perceived 
not as democratization but as bureaucratic indifference and exclusion.62 
Unfortunately, there is very little empirical research that focuses specifically 
on the way that clientelism works in contemporary Brazil. Some of the best 
research has been done by Geert Banck who warned, a long time ago, that 
clientelism was becoming a largely untested and static image and that it 'nei 
ther slips away nor is it immutable until some insurmountable contradictions 
destroy it'.63 Banck's work is interesting because he recognizes that political 
actors in contemporary Brazil have to work much harder to cash in on favor 
itism, nepotism and corruption. The problem, he points out, is that politicians 
are under increasing pressure from above and below to be both more transpar 
ent and accountable and to deliver the goods. Banck is also one of few to 
attempt to examine the specific mechanisms that politicians employ in their 
attempts to maintain their increasingly unreliable bases of support, such as the 
notorious trem de alegria.64 
Outside of Brazil, some of the best research has been done by Gerrit Burg 
wal.65 Burgwal found that clientelism and radicalism were competing yet com 
plimentary strategies that were alternatively employed by the urban poor in 
their attempts to extract, primarily collective, resources from the state. His 
research in a low-income settlement in Quito, Ecuador, demonstrates quite 
clearly that the distinctions that are made between different political strategies 
are much less clear than we are led too believe. More specifically, Burgwal's 
nuanced and extremely thorough ethnography suggests that not only are col 
lective organization and protest fundamental aspects of contemporary clien 
telism but that nepotism, favoritism and exclusion are, themselves, no strang 
ers to so-called radical approaches to community development.66 
Similar conclusions were reached by Cristina Escobar in her research on 
peasant movements in Sucre, Colombia.67 Escobar found that in the region she 
was studying a strong peasant movement emerged to contest the future of the 
agrarian sector in the face of the processes of modernization and capitalization. 
What she discovered was that this movement succeeded in breaking the power 
of traditional landed elites, reconfiguring certain aspects of its relationship 
with a new breed of political brokers, and achieving greater returns for the 
vote. Furthermore, while Escobar recognizes that the success of the peasant 
movement was greatly constrained by the relatively authoritarian nature of the 
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Colombian state, clientelist relations were entered into 'not in the absence of 
'class consciousness' but in spite of it'.68 
Finally, some of the most innovative research is being conducted by Javier 
Auyero on the micro-sociological aspects of Peronism in Argentina. Auyero 
argues that the delivery of patronage is a necessary but insufficient condition 
for the operation of contemporary clientelism and that the 'cluster of beliefs, 
assumptions, styles, skills, and habits encompassing the exchanges 
- 
explaining 
and clarifying them, justifying and legitimizing them 
- is as important as the 
actual exchanges themselves'.69 Auyero's work is important in that it suggests 
that clientelism is as much a social construction as it is an objective or essential 
phenomenon in the abstract. Furthermore, it also suggests that as the relation 
ship between elites and masses changes, clientelism becomes as much a strug 
gle over symbolic resources and political 'credit' as it is over jobs, infrastruc 
ture and access to the state. 
Concluding Remarks 
Clientelism is one of those social science concepts that has achieved honorary 
status over the years. This means that while it features prominently in all but a 
few texts on Latin America, it is rarely the subject of scrutiny. In this paper I 
have argued that, with few exceptions, recent scholarship has insisted on a 
crude, static and misleading distinction between clientelist and non-clientelist 
politics and misrepresented or ignored the ways in which contemporary clien 
telism functions, its meaning as an expression of popular engagement 
- or 
disengagement 
- and its broader political significance. 
This is not to say that clientelism is no longer a mechanism of political mobi 
lization that serves the interests of conservative or even authoritarian elites. 
On the contrary. What it means is that we must take clientelism more seriously 
and be open to the possibility that it plays a role in the democratic process that 
transcends notions of conformity and resistance. Indeed, I would argue that 
recent research on local politics in Brazil and other countries of Latin America 
suggests that many of the so-called 'progressive' features of popular political 
culture that have been attributed to new social movement activity are, in fact, 
elements that are essential, if not specific, to clientelism. In other words, while 
those who embrace or make use of clientelism have not rewoven or reconfi 
gured the fabric of collective action in Brazil, they have, without a doubt, artic 
ulated new demands, established alternative discursive arenas, challenged 
dominant practices and achieved, at the very least, a measure of symbolic pow 
er. 
More specifically, it could be argued that clientelism 
- in its more contempo 
rary guise 
- has fashioned new constituencies that are confrontational, often 
times disloyal and committed to the ideal of rights and that, as a consequence, 
politicians in Brazil have to work much harder at delivering goods and services 
as a means to generate or secure votes. Finally, it could also be argued that the 
constituencies that embrace or make use of clientelism are to be distinguished 
from those that endured traditional clientelist ties with the populist-corporatist 
and authoritarian political establishments of the recent and not so recent past. 
The question is, why has clientelism escaped our attention for so long? Part 
This content downloaded  on Mon, 11 Mar 2013 12:08:18 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
18 | Robert Gay 
of the answer, I would suggest, has to do with a lack of attention to matters of 
definition. In Brazil, clientelism is a term that is often associated with a very 
specific image of a rural and distant past. Alternatively, it is used so loosely and 
indiscriminately that it characterizes every initiative, statement or position that 
is introduced, made or defended by the opposition. Either way, little attention 
is paid to the spectrum of clientelist relations in Brazil or the ways these various 
relations work.70 
Part of the answer also has to do with the way that we chose to examine 
clientelism. It is no mystery why those who adopt a state-centered approach 
and focus on formal political institutions see clientelism as a powerful and 
extremely resilient mechanism of manipulation and control, and why it is pri 
marily anthropologists who visit what Joel Migdal refers to as the 'trenches' 
and 'dispersed field offices' who insist that the relationship between elites and 
masses is contested at each and every turn.71 The question is not so much who is 
right and who is wrong, but rather how can the insights produced by these 
admittedly very different research perspectives and strategies be reconciled 
and used to inform each other?72 
Finally, clientelism has also escaped our attention because we insist on orga 
nizing our thoughts about what is a fluid and extremely complex social phe 
nomenon in terms of a simplistic and uncompromising dichotomy that, in real 
ity, simply does not exist.73 As a consequence, clientelism has long been consid 
ered a residual, static and uninteresting category that is unworthy of analysis. 
Unfortunately, this means that the ways in which the least privileged elements 
of Brazilian society participate in the political process have been given short 
thrift. It also means that instead of being perceived as agents of social and 
political change, the poor are, essentially, blamed for everything. 
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